ABSTRACT Designing lightweight security protocols for cloud-based Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications for battery-limited mobile devices, such as smart phones and laptops, is a topic of recent focus. Ciphertextpolicy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a viable solution, particularly for cloud deployment, as an encryptor can ''write'' the access policy so that only authorized users can decrypt and have access to the data. However, most existing CP-ABE schemes are based on the costly bilinear maps, and require long decryption keys, ciphertexts and incur significant computation costs in the encryption and decryption (e.g. costs is at least linear to the number of attributes involved in the access policy). These design drawbacks prevent the deployment of CP-ABE schemes on battery-limited mobile devices. In this paper, we propose a new RSA-based CP-ABE scheme with constant size secret keys and ciphertexts (CSKC) and has O(1) timecomplexity for each decryption and encryption. Our scheme is then shown to be secure against a chosenciphertext adversary, as well as been an efficient solution with the expressive AND gate access structures (in comparison to other related existing schemes). Thus, the proposed scheme is suitable for deployment on battery-limited mobile devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularity and availability of battery-limited mobile devices (e.g. Android and iOS devices), there is an increasing demand to design efficient and secure lightweight applications for such devices [1] - [3] . In a ciphertext-policy attributebased encryption (CP-ABE), data are encrypted based on the access policy and each user associated with a set of attributes is able to decrypt a ciphertext, if and only, if the user's attributes fulfill the ciphertext access policy. Thus, CP-ABE is extremely suitable for cloud computing environment because it enables data owners to make and enforce access policies themselves [4] - [8] , [49] . Since most mobile devices are battery-limited, key design criteria in a CP-ABE scheme should include constant size secret key and constant size ciphertext, as well as a cost efficient mechanism for encryption and decryption. the access policy and decide who can access the data, it is more suited for access control applications as compared to KP-ABE schemes.
Unsurprisingly, several CP-ABE schemes with constant size ciphertexts [4] , [21] - [23] and constant size secret keys [21] , [24] with an expressive access structure based on bilinear maps have been proposed in recent times. In these schemes, with the exception of the EMNOS scheme [21] , only the ciphertexts or the secret keys are of constant size (but not both). The EMNOS scheme [21] offers only (n, n)-threshold and most existing schemes require significant computational complexity for encryption and decryption, which are at least linear to the number of attributes involved in the access policy. In addition, these schemes are based on bilinear maps, which is significantly more costly than schemes based on conventional cryptosystems [9] , [25] . Thus, designing a cost efficient and expressive access structure CP-ABE with the constant size secret keys and ciphertexts (CSKC) using conventional public-key cryptosystems remains a research challenge. This is the gap that we seek to address.
In this paper, we propose a RSA-based AND-gate access structure CP-ABE scheme, which offers constant size secret keys and ciphertexts with efficient encryption and decryption mechanism. In our scheme, a secret key associated with an attribute set A is used to decrypt ciphertexts with the access policy P if and only if P ⊆ A. Our scheme requires only O(1) time-complexity. It is clear from Table 1 , only our scheme provides constant size secret keys and ciphertexts without using bilinear maps. We then demonstrate the security of the scheme under the selective security model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to design such a provably secure RSA-based AND-gate access structure CP-ABE scheme. Due to the underlying RSA architecture, our scheme is suitable for practical deployments on batterylimited devices. Moreover, our scheme provides an efficient solution to the encryption and decryption, which requires only O(1) time-complexity (see Tables 3 and 6 ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the mathematical preliminaries and definitions required in the understanding of the proposed scheme. In Section III, we briefly discuss the key management in a defined access structure. In Sections IV and V, we present the proposed scheme and the security analysis, respectively. In Section VI, we evaluate the performance of our scheme with related schemes. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS
In this section, we discuss the mathematical preliminaries and definitions associated with ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption.
A. ATTRIBUTE AND ACCESS STRUCTURE
We define the attribute and access policy as provided in [24] . Let the attribute universe U = {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n } be the set of n attributes A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n . We denote an attribute set of a user by A ⊆ U, and an n-bit string a 1 a 2 · · · a n associated with A is defined as follows:
For example, if n = 4 and A = {A 1 , A 2 , A 4 }, the 4-bit string associated with A becomes 1101. In addition, we define an access policy by P specified with attributes in U, and an n-bit string b 1 b 2 · · · b n associated with P is defined as follows:
For example, for n = 4 the string 1010 associated with P means that P requires the set of the attributes
In this paper, we consider the AND gate access control structure represented by the attributes from U. Assume that a 1 a 2 · · · a n is an n-bit string associated with attribute set A and b 1 b 2 · · · b n an n-bit string associated with the access policy P. Then, P ⊆ A if and only if a i ≥ b i , for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n. We call that the attribute set A fulfills the access policy P if and only if P ⊆ A. 
B. COMPUTATIONALLY HARD PROBLEMS
In this section, we consider the following two computational problems.
1) INTEGER FACTORIZATION PROBLEM (IFP)
Let p and q be ρ-bit primes and N = pq. Assume that Gen F be a polynomial-time algorithm which takes an input 1 ρ and outputs (N , p, q) . The factoring assumption relative to Gen F states that given N , it is computationally infeasible (hard) problem to derive p and q, except with negligible probability in ρ. The formal definition of this problem follows that of [28] : for a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A, the factoring advantage is defined by
The factoring assumption (with respect to Gen F ) states that Adv IFP Gen F ,A (ρ) is negligible in ρ for every PPT A. We say that (t IFP , IFP )-IFP assumption holds if Adv IFP Gen F ,A (ρ) ≤ IFP (ρ), for any sufficiently small IFP (ρ) > 0, and its running time is at most t IFP .
2) COMPUTATIONAL Diffie-Hellman PROBLEM (CDHP)
The problem of breaking the Diffie-Hellman scheme with a RSA modulus N = pq and base g is equivalent to the problem of computing a value of the following function [29] :
Here, g N represents a cyclic subgroup of Z * N generated by g. The adversary A advantage in solving the CDHP is:
We say that (t CDHP , CDHP )-CDH assumption holds if Adv CDHP Z N ,A (ρ) ≤ CDHP , for any sufficiently small CDHP > 0, with its running time at most t CDHP .
As stated in [29] , any algorithm that will break the CDHP for a non-negligible proportion of the possible inputs can be used to factor N . This implies any algorithm that will break the CDHP for a given modulus N can also be used to break the original Diffie-Hellman scheme for the prime moduli that are factors of N .
Definition 1 ((t, )-Hard n-IF-CDH Problem):
We say that a t-polynomial time algorithm A, which outputs a bit γ ∈ {0, 1}, has an advantage Adv
C. DEFINITION OF CP-ABE SCHEME
A CP-ABE encryption scheme is composed of four algorithms, namely, Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt. These algorithms are defined as follows [24] :
• Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter ρ and the universe of attributes U = {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n } as inputs, and then outputs a master public key MPK and its corresponding master secret key MSK .
• Encrypt: It takes an access policy P, the master public key MPK and plaintext M as inputs. The encryption algorithm E[P, M ] outputs a ciphertext C.
• KeyGen: The inputs of this algorithm are an attribute set A, the master public key MPK and the master secret key MSK . The key generation algorithm then outputs a user secret key (decryption key) k u corresponding to A.
• Decrypt: It takes a ciphertext C generated with access policy P, the public key MPK and the secret key k u corresponding to the attribute set A as inputs, and outputs the plaintext M or outputs null (⊥) using the decryption algorithm D[C, P, k u , A]. A CP-ABE scheme must satisfy the following property. For any (MPK , MSK ), a ciphertext E[P, M ] and the secret key k u , if P ⊆ A, the decryption algorithm always outputs the corrected plaintext M . Otherwise, the plaintext in E[P, M ] cannot be decrypted using the key k u .
D. SELECTIVE GAME FOR CP-ABE SCHEME
In order to prove the security under chosen ciphertext attack, we use the selective game for a CP-ABE scheme as defined in [21] , [24] . The CP-ABE game captures the indistinguishability of messages and the collision-resistance of user secret keys, namely, attackers cannot generate a new secret key by combining their secret keys. To capture the collisionresistance, the multiple secret key queries can be issued by an adversary A after the challenge phase. The game between the adversary A and a challenger B is described as follows.
• Initialization: A outputs the challenge as an n-bit access policy P and sends it to the challenger B.
• Setup: B runs Setup and KeyGen algorithms with the security parameter ρ to generate the key pair (MSK , MPK ) and then gives MPK to A.
• Query: A makes following queries to the challenger B.
-A queries for the secret key k u i of any attribute set A i , which does not fulfill the access policy P . B answers with a secret key k u i for these attributes.
• Challenge: In this phase, the adversary A outputs (M 0 , M 1 ) for challenge. It requires that A does not query a secret key on an attribute set A satisfying P ⊆ A. The challenger B responds by picking a random c ∈ {0, 1} and computing ciphertext E[P , M c ] for challenge to A.
• Query: The adversary A can continue with the secret key queries and decryption queries except with a secret key query on any A fulfilling P and the decryption query on E[P , M c ].
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• Guess: The adversary A outputs a guess c g of c , and wins the game if c g = c . In this game, the advantage of A is defined by 
III. KEY MANAGEMENT IN DEFINED ACCESS STRUCTURE
In this section, we discuss the key management in the defined access structure motivated by the scheme in [30] , which is a variant of Akl-Taylor's scheme [31] . The scheme in [30] is proven secure against key recovery attacks. Let Z N be the set of equivalence classes of the integers modulo N = pq, where p and q are RSA secure primes with p = q. For any non-zero element a ∈ Z N , gcd(a, N ) = 1 if and only if there exists a multiplicative inverse b for a (mod N ), that is, ab ≡ 1 (mod N ) or b ≡ a −1 (mod N ) which can be computed efficiently using the extended Euclidean gcd algorithm, where 1 ∈ Z N is the multiplicative identity. The key management is described below.
Pick a secure prime number
, where p i = p j if and only if i = j. Assume that {φ(N ), q 1 , · · · , q n } be the secret parameters and {N , p 1 , · · · , p n } the public parameters. Since factoring the product N = pq is computationally hard problem, computing φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1) without the knowledge of secure primes p and q is also computationally infeasible. This implies that computing the secret primes q i using the corresponding public prime p i depends on the integer factorization problem, and as a result, computing the prime q i such that p i q i ≡ 1 (mod φ(N )) is also computationally hard problem. Choose a random number g such that 2 < g < N − 1, and gcd(g, N ) = 1, and compute the secret keys K A and K P associated to the attribute set A and access policy P, respectively, as follows:
where can not be an integer when P A.
On the other hand, if P ⊆ A, the secret key K P is computed as follows:
Thus, we arrive at the result. 4 and e P = p 1 p 4 . K P using K A is computed as follows:
IV. PROPOSED CP-ABE-CSKC SCHEME
In this section, we present the proposed CP-ABE scheme with constant size secret keys and ciphertexts, hereafter referred to as CP-ABE-CSKC. The notations used in our scheme are listed in Table 2 . For ease of reading, mod(N ) will be omitted from g z (mod N ) for the remainder of this paper (i.e. g z instead of g z (mod N )). The CP-ABE-CSKC scheme consists of the following four phases, namely: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen and Decrypt.
A. SETUP PHASE
In this phase, the setup algorithm takes the security parameter ρ and the universe of attributes U = {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A n } as inputs. This algorithm consists of the following steps: S1. Choose two RSA primes p and q with p = q, and compute N = pq. Then, randomly select the RSA public exponent p i with gcd(p i , φ(N )) = 1, and compute q i such that p i q i ≡ 1 (mod φ(N )) corresponding to each attribute A i ∈ U, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Further, pick two system private keys k and x such that 
Next, select a random number g such that 2 < g < N − 1 and gcd(g, N ) = 1. S2. Choose three one-way collision-resistance hash functions H 1 , H 2 and H 3 as follows:
where l σ is the length of a random string under the security parameter and l m the length of plaintext message M .
S3. Compute the public parameters
Finally, output the master secret key MSK and master public key MPK , where
B. ENCRYPT PHASE
Our encryption is based on the approach presented in [9] , [24] , [32] to achieve security against chosen-ciphertext attack:
where E(σ m , H 1 (P, M , σ m ) represents an attribute-based encryption on a random secret σ m using the hash output r m = H 1 (P, M , σ m ) as the random number. More precisely, the random secret σ m is encrypted with the key g r m d P , and the plaintext M is encrypted with random secret σ m , and they are denoted by C σ m and C m , respectively, in the ciphertext C. In addition, we compute the signature S m = H 1 (σ m , M ) on the plaintext M using the random secret σ m in order to verify the validity of the derived plaintext M . The other components of the ciphertext C are Y m and R m . Our new encryption algorithm takes an access policy P ⊆ U, where |P| = 0, the master public key MPK and a plaintext message M as inputs, and outputs the ciphertext C = {Y m , R m , C σ m , C m , S m } using the following steps: E1. Pick a random number σ m ∈ {0, 1} l σ and compute
In this phase, the key generation algorithm takes a user attribute set A, master public key MPK and master secret key MSK as inputs, and then generates a user secret key k u using the following steps:
Pick two random numbers r u and t u , and compute s u such that it satisfies the condition
and k 2 = r u − kt u (mod φ(N )). Finally, this algorithm outputs the user secret key k u as
D. DECRYPT PHASE
This phase describes our decryption algorithm. The decryption algorithm takes the secret key k u = (k 1 , k 2 ) corresponding to the attribute set A and ciphertext C = {P, Y m , R m , C σ m , C m , S m } corresponding to the access policy P, and outputs the plaintext message M using the following steps: D1. From Proposition 1,
is an integer, if and only, if P ⊆ A. In this case, compute
Otherwise,
is not an integer; thus, computation of K m is computationally infeasible. 
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed CP-ABE-CSKC scheme for different possible attacks. The main VOLUME 5, 2017
goal of selective security for a CP-ABE scheme is to capture the indistinguishability of messages and the collision resistance of secret keys, that is, attackers are not able to generate a new user secret key by combining their secret keys (see [27] , [33] ). In this paper, we follow the group generic model to prove that our scheme is secure against possible known attacks under the hardness assumption of factorization of RSA modulus N = pq and hardness of solving computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP) in Z N , where p and q are large primes and p = q. We then prove that our scheme is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack under the selective security game. [34] , [35] Proof: Assume that a group of users u i , i = 1, · · · , l, corresponding to the attribute set A i collaborate among each other and try to derive the system private key pair (k, x) using their valid secret keys
, where
From
Step K2 of the KeyGen algorithm (Section IV-C), we have
From Equation (3), it is clear that if s u i and r u i are known, it is solvable for k and x, and has a unique solution. Thus, the solution produces the original values of k and x. However, Equations (1) and (2) respectively form the system of l linear equations with 2l + 1 unknowns. From Proposition 2, note that Equation (1) requires to randomly guess two unknowns (s u i , t u i ) in order to solve x, and Equation (2) also requires to randomly guess two unknowns (r u i , t u i ) to solve k. Hence, from the corrupted user secret keys k u i , ∀i = 1, 2, · · · , l, the system's private key pair (k, x) is unknown, and as result, the random numbers s u i and r u i are also unknown to an adversary. Theorem 2: Our scheme is secure against an adversary for deriving the valid user secret key k u = (k 1 , k 2 ) corresponding to the attribute set A.
Proof: From Theorem 1, it follows that computing the system private key pair (k, x) is computationally infeasible by an adversary A. This implies that it is computationally infeasible for the adversary A to compute the valid pair k u = (k 1 , k 2 ) corresponding to the attribute set A. The adversary A can randomly choose r u and t u , and compute s u such that it satisfies the condition d A = ks u +r u x (mod φ(N )). However, to compute the value s u , A requires the system private key pair (k, x) and RSA secret d A . Thus, generating the valid user secret key k u is computationally infeasible problem by A due to the intractability of the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) because it depends on the Euler's totient function φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). 
Theorem 3: Under the hardness of solving the integer factorization problem, our scheme is secure against an adversary (also a legitimate user u) for deriving the key K
where C = A AND B.
For example, assume U = {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 } is an attribute universe with four attributes A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , A 4 . Let A = 0110, B = 1100, and P = 1010. Therefore, D = (A OR B) = 1110 and C = (A AND B) = 0100. Then, P A, P B, and P ⊆ D. The key K m derivation is as follows:
Since solving the CDH problem in Z N is as hard as solving factorization of RSA modulus N = pq, no collaborative user can derive the valid key K m of C when P A and P B under the CDH assumption. Diffi-Hellman problem) . Let N = pq be the RSA modulus and g ∈ Z N such that Proof: We follow the contradiction proof method as presented in [9] , [24] , [36] to prove that an algorithm B has an advantage more than
Remark 2: In the defined attribute-based encryption, the components are computed as C
The following three random oracles are used by an adversary:
• H 2 oracle: Let the query to this oracle be K m . The response of the query H 2 (K m ) is a random number R i ∈ {0, 1} l σm .
• H 3 oracle: Let the query to this oracle be t i . The response of the query H 3 (t i ) is a random number Q i ∈ {0, 1} ł m .
• H 1 oracle: Let the query to this oracle be (P i , M i , t i ). The query to H 1 (P i , M i , t i ) responds with a random number r i ∈ {0, 1} ρ . Then, the adversary queries for the secret keys and the query responds with the valid secret keys (user secret keys). For any decryption query on E[P i , M i ], if there exists (P i , M i , t i , r i , R i , Q i ) in the query list such that the ciphertext is generated using r i , the decryption query outputs M i . Otherwise, it outputs null. Assume that no query will be aborted since all valid encryptions need the response from hash oracles, and the response contains the random number r i used in encryption.
Next, the adversary outputs two messages (M 0 , M 1 ) for the challenge, and then the challenge query replies with the following ciphertext C c corresponding to the challenged access policy P such that no queried secret keys satisfy P :
• Choose R ∈ {0, 1} l σm , Q ∈ {0, 1} ł m , and S ∈ {0, 1} ρ .
• Choose a random number r m ∈ {0, 1} ρ . 
Let S be an event that the adversary A queries the oracle H 2 at an element T = g r m d P ∈ Z N . Then, we have
From Theorem 4, B knows the private keys, which do not satisfy the challenge ciphertext C c . Then, g r m d P can be computed only if the CDH problem can be solved in the RSA group Z N . When B chooses randomly a tuple in the H 2 query list, the probability that the chosen tuple is equal to g r m d P is given by
The computation of each secret key requires O(1) group inverse operations and each decryption requires O(1) group exponentiation operations. According to B, time to solve the CDH problem in Z N is t = t + O(q c t c + q e t inv + q H 1 t exp ). From the above result, we see that it is contradictive with
Hence, the theorem is proved.
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Both ZZCLL [4] and our scheme require only O(1) time complexity for each encryption and decryption (see Table 3 ). However, from Table 1 , it is clear that the ZZCLL scheme [4] does not provide constant size secret keys for the users, which is an essential security requirement for mobile device deployment. On the other hand, the EMNOS scheme [21] offers constant size ciphertexts and secret keys. However, it provides only (n, n)-threshold and incurs significant computational cost for encryption. The GSWV scheme [24] is efficient for shorter secret keys, but it fails to provide constant size ciphertexts or efficient encryption and decryption with O(1) time-complexity. Also demonstrated in Table 1 , our scheme is the only scheme to provide both constant size secret keys and ciphertexts with expressive access structure, and efficient encryption and decryption with O(1) time-complexity without using bilinear maps.
Following the approach in [25] , we will now evaluate the performance using experiments. The execution timings for various operations using MIRACL [37] and PBC [38] libraries are listed in Table 4 . The experiment is conducted for the group G over the FST curve. Note that one point multiplication operation T G in G requires 1.1 ms and the corresponding paring operation T e requires 3.1 ms, whereas one 1024-bit RSA decryption and encryption operations require 3.88 ms and 0.02 ms, respectively. Also, one field exponentiation operation T Z N in Z * N (|N | = 1024) requires 0.64 ms. Since the computation cost required for hashing operation and AES encryption/decryption operation are negligible [25] , [39] , we omit these operations in our performance comparison.
For the experiments, let the total number of attributes in the system be n = 1000. We also assume that |P| = 500 and |A| = 600. The parameters used in the experiment are shown in Table 5 . Table 6 lists the comparison of experimental computational costs among our scheme and other related schemes. We observe that encryption and decryption for EMNOS [21] require 1102.38 ms and 7.48 ms, respectively. ZZCLL [4] , ZH [22] and GSWV [24] require 3.30 ms and 6.20 ms, 2.20 ms and 3103.10 ms, 1102.20 ms and 229.94 ms for encryption and decryption, respectively. On the other hand, our scheme needs only 1.92 ms and 1.92 ms for encryption and decryption, respectively. Thus, it clear that our scheme requires minimal computational costs for both encryption and decryption, compared to the other related CP-ABE schemes in Table 6 .
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the current Internet-connected society, battery-limited mobile devices are likely to be more prevalent. For example, an Internet-of-Things (IoT) or Cloud-of-Things (CoT) environment generally consists of battery-limited devices such as Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators, mobile devices, and wearable devices. Hence, IoT (or CoT) security [40] , [41] , forensics [42] , [43] and privacy [44] are topics of current interest. Due to the nature (e.g. heterogeneous) and level of interactivity between IoT or CoT devices, the design of any security solution needs to take into consideration efficiency and lightweight requirements [2] , [3] . Although CP-ABE is one efficient and viable method that can be widely applied to realize access control in a wide range of applications, such as in medical systems and education systems [45] - [48] , it may not be naively deployed in an IoT and CoT environment due to its complexity and high overhead.
The scheme presented in this paper, however, is suited for IoT and CoT deployments. Our RSA-based CP-ABE-CSKC scheme offers constant size secret keys and constant size ciphertexts with an expressive AND gate access structure without using bilinear maps. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such scheme. We demonstrated that the scheme provides an efficient solution to both encryption and decryption with O(1) time-complexity. We also proved that our scheme is secure against possible known attacks, such as key recovery and collision attacks, as well as under the chosenciphertext adversary.
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